PALACE-PRADHAN BID TO SAVE SIKKIM
Talks between the Palace and the leadership of the Sikkim Congress headed by Pradhan led to a dramatic development within the ruling party. It culminated in the passing of a controversial resolution aimed at safeguarding Sikkim’s separate identity – symbolised by the Chogyal and the national flag – and reducing the powers of the Chief Executive.
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| KC Pradhan |
In a letter dated March 12, 1975 to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, twenty-nine of the thirty-two legislators (excluding Kazi, Khatiwada and Kalzang Gyatso of the Sikkim National Party), demanded that the Chief Executive be stripped from his powers and be made an adviser to the Sikkim Government in the “interests of smooth running of the administration and consonant with the dignity and prestige of the Sikkimese people,” transfer of three portfolios, vis. Home, Finance and Establishment from the Chief Executive to the Chief Minister; and removal of non-extension services of Indian officers who were in Sikkim on deputation.
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| (Left to Right) Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, B.S. Das and K.C. Pradhan. |
The resolution, while welcoming the Chogyal’s initiative on holding a “dialogue with the Chief Minister,” demanded the removal of three Indian offficers-on-duty (OSDs) – Jayanta Sanyal, K.M. Lal, and Davy Manavalam – who played a vital role in favour of Kazi during this period.
Unfortunately, Lal got hold of the document containing the 6 resolutions when only 18 Assembly members had signed. In the House of 32, only 17 members were needed to rectify past mistakes. Datta-Ray writes, “He (Lal) realised how explosive it could be. The men who were constantly being lauded in India as Sikkim’s first freely elected representatives, and as the Chogyal’s implacable enemies, the very leaders New Delhi was using as a human battering-ram against the palace, had given notice of their intention of going their own way. They did not want the chief executive or his lieutenants. They wanted full governing powers.” He adds, “They were even prepared to come to terms with the Chogyal. If their demands reached the press or Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi’s government K.C. Pradhan
would stand vindicated by the very process it had fostered, and rejected by the men it was sponsoring. The conspiracy would have to be nipped in the bud if New Delhi were to save the achievements of the previous two years. More, the possibility of recurrence would firmly have to be ruled out. That could only be done by removing the totems of Sikkim’s separate identity – flag, distinctive number plates, freedom from Indian taxes, PO, chief executive and the Chogyal; everything, in fact, that remained of a kingdom protected by treaty even if it was called an associate state.”
Pradhan later (in 1990s) maintained that it was his Cabinet colleague, Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, who conspired with the Chief Executive and mischievously betrayed the Sikkimese people. According to him, Lepcha visited Pradhan’s residence at Development Area in Gangtok, swore that he would keep the resolution document a top secret, and took all the four copies of the six-point resolution, including the original. He then promptly handed over the documents to Lal, who knowing that the plot was chalked out at Kazi’s residence in Gangtok, promised him the Chief Minister’s post.
(Ref: Sons of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Notion Press, 2020.)